Development Challenges of Secondary and Small Airports in California, Research Report 11-21 by Ashiabor, Senanu & Wei, Wenbin
San Jose State University
SJSU ScholarWorks
Mineta Transportation Institute Publications
6-1-2012
Development Challenges of Secondary and Small
Airports in California, Research Report 11-21
Senanu Ashiabor
San Jose State University
Wenbin Wei
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/mti_publications
Part of the Transportation Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mineta Transportation Institute
Publications by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Senanu Ashiabor and Wenbin Wei. "Development Challenges of Secondary and Small Airports in California, Research Report 11-21"
Mineta Transportation Institute Publications (2012).
Development Challenges of 
Secondary and Small Airports 
in California
MTI Report 11-21
Funded by U.S. Department of 
Transportation and California 
Department of Transportation
M
T
I
D
evelopm
ent C
hallenges of Secondary and Sm
all A
irports in C
alifornia
M
T
I Report 11-21
June 2012
The Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies was established by Congress in the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA). The Institute’s Board of Trustees revised the name to Mineta 
Transportation Institute (MTI) in 1996. Reauthorized in 1998, MTI was selected by the U.S. Department of Transportation 
through a competitive process in 2002 as a national “Center of Excellence.” The Institute is funded by Congress through the 
United States Department of Transportation’s Research and Innovative Technology Administration, the California Legislature 
through the Department of Transportation (Caltrans), and by private grants and donations. 
The Institute receives oversight from an internationally respected Board of Trustees whose members represent all major surface 
transportation modes. MTI’s focus on policy and management resulted from a Board assessment of the industry’s unmet needs 
and led directly to the choice of the San José State University College of Business as the Institute’s home.  The Board provides 
policy direction, assists with needs assessment, and connects the Institute and its programs with the international transportation 
community.
MTI’s transportation policy work is centered on three primary responsibilities: 
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
Research 
MTI works to provide policy-oriented research for all levels of 
government and the private sector to foster the development 
of optimum surface transportation systems. Research areas in-
clude: transportation security; planning and policy development; 
interrelationships among transportation, land use, and the 
environment; transportation finance; and collaborative labor-
management relations. Certified Research Associates conduct 
the research. Certification requires an advanced degree, gener-
ally a Ph.D., a record of academic publications, and profession-
al references. Research projects culminate in a peer-reviewed 
publication, available both in hardcopy and on TransWeb, 
the MTI website (http://transweb.sjsu.edu). 
Education  
The educational goal of the Institute is to provide graduate-lev-
el education to students seeking a career in the development 
and operation of surface transportation programs. MTI, through 
San José State University, offers an AACSB-accredited Master of 
Science in Transportation Management and a graduate Certifi-
cate in Transportation Management that serve to prepare the na-
tion’s transportation managers for the 21st century. The master’s 
degree is the highest conferred by the California State Uni-
versity system. With the active assistance of the California 
Department of Transportation, MTI delivers its classes over 
a state-of-the-art videoconference network throughout 
the state of California and via webcasting beyond, allowing 
working transportation professionals to pursue an advanced 
degree regardless of their location. To meet the needs of 
employers seeking a diverse workforce, MTI’s education 
program promotes enrollment to under-represented groups. 
Information and Technology Transfer 
MTI promotes the availability of completed research to 
professional organizations and journals and works to 
integrate the research findings into the graduate education 
program. In addition to publishing the studies, the Institute 
also sponsors symposia to disseminate research results 
to transportation professionals and encourages Research 
Associates to present their findings at conferences. The 
World in Motion, MTI’s quarterly newsletter, covers 
innovation in the Institute’s research and education pro-
grams. MTI’s extensive collection of transportation-related 
publications is integrated into San José State University’s 
world-class Martin Luther King, Jr. Library. 
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and accuracy of the information presented 
herein. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation, University Transportation Centers 
Program and the California Department of Transportation, in the interest of information exchange. This report does not necessarily 
reflect the official views or policies of the U.S. government, State of California, or the Mineta Transportation Institute, who assume no liability 
for the contents or use thereof. This report does not constitute a standard specification, design standard, or regulation.
DISCLAIMER
MTI FOUNDER 
Hon. Norman Y. Mineta
MTI BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Honorary Chairman
John L. Mica (Ex-Officio)
Chair
House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee
House of Representatives
Honorary Co-Chair, Honorable
Nick Rahall (Ex-Officio)
Vice Chairman
House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee
House of Representatives
Chair, Mortimer Downey 
(TE 2013)
Senior Advisor
PB Consult Inc.
Vice Chair,  Steve Heminger 
(TE 2013)
Executive Director
Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission
Executive Director 
Rod Diridon* (TE 2011)
Mineta Transportation Institute
Thomas E. Barron (TE 2013)
President
Parsons Transportation Group
Ignacio Barron de Angoiti 
(Ex-Officio)
Director Passenger and High Speed 
Department
International Union of Railways 
(UIC)
Joseph Boardman (Ex-Officio)
Chief Executive Officer
Amtrak
Donald H. Camph (TE 2012)
President
California Institute for Technology 
Exchange
Anne P. Canby (TE 2011)
President
Surface Transportation Policy Project
Julie Cunningham (TE 2013)
Executive Director/CEO
Conference of Minority 
Transportation Officials
William Dorey (TE 2012)
President/CEO
Granite Construction Inc.
Malcolm Dougherty  
(Ex-Officio)
Acting Director
California Department of 
Transportation
Nuria I. Fernandez (TE 2013)
Senior Vice President
Major Programs Group CHRMHill
Rose Guilbault (TE 2012)
Vice President
American Automobile Association
Ed Hamberger (Ex-Officio)
President/CEO
Association of American Railroads
John Horsley 
(Ex-Officio)*
Executive Director  
American Association of State 
Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO)
Will Kempton (TE 2012)
CEO
Orange County Transportation 
Authority
Michael P. Melaniphy 
(Ex-Officio)
President & CEO
American Public Transportation 
Association (APTA)
William Millar* (Ex-Officio)
President
American Public Transportation 
Association (APTA)
Norman Y. Mineta (Ex-Officio)
Vice Chairman
Hill & Knowlton
Secretary of Transportation (ret.)
Stephanie L. Pinson (TE 2013)
President/COO
Gilbert Tweed Associates, Inc.
David Steele (Ex-Officio)
Dean, College of Business
San José State University
Paul Toliver* (TE 2013)
President
New Age Industries
Michael S. Townes (TE 2011)
President/CEO (ret.)
Transportation District Commision of 
Hampton Roads
David L. Turney* (TE 2012)
Chairman, President & CEO
Digital Recorders, Inc.
Edward Wytkind (Ex-Officio)
President 
Transportation Trades Department,
AFL-CIO
Hon. Rod Diridon, Sr.
Executive Director
Karen E. Philbrick, Ph.D.
Research Director
Peter Haas, Ph.D.
Education Director
Donna Maurillo
Communications Director 
 
Brian Michael Jenkins
National Transportation Security Center  
 
Asha Weinstein Agrawal, Ph.D.
National Transportation Finance Center
Asha Weinstein Agrawal, Ph.D.
Urban and Regional Planning 
San José State University
Jan Botha, Ph.D.
Civil & Environmental Engineering
San José State University
 
Katherine Kao Cushing, Ph.D.
Enviromental Science 
San José State University 
 
Dave Czerwinski, Ph.D.
Marketing and Decision Science 
San José State University
Frances Edwards, Ph.D.
Political Science 
San José State University
 
Taeho Park, Ph.D.
Organization and Management 
San José State University
Diana Wu
Martin Luther King, Jr. Library
San José State University
Directors Research Associates Policy Oversight Committee
**     Honorary
*   Chair
^    Vice Chair
#    Past Chair
A publication of
Mineta Transportation Institute
Created by Congress in 1991
College of Business
San José State University
San José, CA 95192-0219
REPORT 11-21
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES OF SECONDARY AND SMALL 
AIRPORTS IN CALIFORNIA
Senanu Ashiabor, Ph.D.
Wenbin Wei, Ph.D.
June 2012
TECHNICAL REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1. Report No. 2. Government Acession No. 3. Recipient’s Catalog No.
4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Authors 8. Performing Organization Report
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No.
11. Contract or Grant No.
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 13. Type of Report and Period Covered
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplemental Notes
16. Abstract
17. Key Words 18. Distribution Statement
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72)
58
CA-MTI-12-2804
Development Challenges of Secondary and Small Airports in California June 2012
MTI Report 11-21Senanu Ashiabor, Ph.D. and Wenbin Wei, Ph.D.
Mineta Transportation Institute 
College of Business 
San José State University 
San José, CA 95192-0219
California Department of Transportation
Office of Research—MS42
P.O. Box 942873
Sacramento, CA 94273-0001
U.S. Department of Transportation
Research & Innovative Technology Admin.
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20590
Final Report
 
UnclassifiedUnclassified
No restrictions. This document is available to the public through 
The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161
DTRT07-G-0054
$15.00
Airports; Airlines; Secondary 
airports; Low-cost carriers; Very 
light jets
This study investigates the development of secondary and smaller airports in California.  Low-Cost Carrier (LCC) business is 
growing at these airports because they offer reduced operating costs, and they have adequate capacity to help LCCs avoid 
battling with incumbent airlines at the large hubs for limited resources, such as gates.
However, increased LCC aircraft operations at the secondary airports have led to significant noise impacts on the surrounding 
communities and this has been a challenge for the secondary airport operators. They have imposed operational curfews to limit 
the noise impacts, but this approach constrains the resident airlines that want to increase their traffic. As a result, some LCCs 
have begun to initiate flights out of the large hubs.
Statistics from this study show that the LCCs have replaced the legacy airlines as the dominant air provider in the state. With 
their growing dominance, the LCCs will become more attractive to the large hub airports, and the secondary airports will face 
increased competition in retaining them. To retain those LCCs, the secondary airports must better understand how LCCs make 
investment decisions related to airport development. At the same time, they must better educate the LCCs about their airport 
needs.
To order this publication, please contact:
Mineta Transportation Institute 
College of Business 
San José State University 
San José, CA 95192-0219
Tel: (408) 924-7560 
Fax: (408) 924-7565 
Email: mineta-institute@sjsu.edu 
transweb.sjsu.edu
by Mineta Transportation Institute 
All rights reserved
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 
Copyright © 2012
2012936926
062512
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
iv  
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We want to acknowledge the officials at San José, Palomar-McClellan, Concord, Long 
Beach and Bob Hope (Burbank) Airports that took time from their busy schedules to sit 
down and talk to us about conditions at their airport and how they are managing the facilities 
on a daily basis.
We are also very grateful for the support and assistance provided by staff of the Mineta 
Transportation Institute (MTI) during the study. Thanks to Meg Fitts, MTI research support 
manager for most of the study, for assisting us in navigating the various administrative 
hurdles while working on the project. Special thanks to MTI deputy executive director 
and research director Dr. Karen Philbrick for her patience and support; we are especially 
thankful for her prompt response to our requests during the study.
We also want to mention Diana Pancholi from the Planning and Public Policy Department of 
San José State University.  She assisted in conducting the literature review for the project. 
The authors also thank the rest of the MTI staff, including director of communications and 
technology transfer Donna Maurillo; student publications assistant Sahil Rahimi; student 
research support assistant Joey Mercado; and webmaster Frances Cherman, who also 
provided editorial support.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
vi Acknowledgments
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary 1
I. Introduction 3
II. Overview of the California Airport System 5
III. Low-Cost Carriers at California Airports 7
Low-Cost Carrier Dominance at Secondary Airports in Metropolitan Regions 7
A Cost-Sensitive Approach to Infrastructure Investments at Airports  12
Efficient Operations at Airports 13
Risks of Focusing on Low-Cost Carriers 13
IV. Secondary Airports with Significant Low-Cost Carrier Presence 15
Long Beach Airport: A Focus City Airport for Jetblue 15
Bob Hope Airport: Secondary Airport Captive to Self-Imposed Noise Restriction 18
Summary 19
V. Secondary Airports with Limited/No Low-Cost Carrier Presence 21
Mineta San José International Airport: An Airport with Spare Capacity 21
VI. Smaller Airports in the California Aviation System 23
Mcclellan-Palomar Airport: Small Airport Struggling to Attract Air Service 23
Utilization of General Aviation Service at Smaller Airports 25
Sustaining Air Service Through the Essential Air Service Program 28
VII. Summary and Conclusions 31
VIII. Recommendations 33
Recommendations for Secondary Airports 33
Recommendations for Small Airports 34
Managing the Airports as a System 35
Appendix A: Very Light Jet Cost Model  37
Endnotes 43
Abbreviations and Acronyms 47
Bibliography 49
About the Authors 55
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
viii Table of Contents
Peer Review 57
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Enplanements Highlighting Impact of Southwest Entry at Long Beach Airport 16
2. City of Long Beach Municipal Noise Ordinance 1995 17
3. Cost per Mile of Business Jet Aircraft Over Stage Length and Annual Utilization 26
4. Cost-per-Seat-Mile of a Pilatus PC-12 Single Engine Turboprop Aircraft  
   Over Stage Length and Annual Utilization 27
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
x List of Figures
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
xi
LIST OF TABLES
1. 2010 Passenger Enplanements at Primary US Airports 5
2. Cumulative Flight Distribution Among Top 15 Airports in California 6
3. Ranking of Top 5 Airlines by Enplanements at Top 15 Airports in California 
   in 1990 7
4. Ranking of Top 5 Airlines by Enplanements at Top 15 Airports in California 
   in 1995 8
5. Ranking of Top 5 Airlines by Enplanements at Top 15 Airports in California 
   in 2000 8
6. Ranking of Top 5 Airlines by Enplanements at Top 15 Airports in California 
   in 2005 9
7. Ranking of Top 5 Airlines by Enplanements at Top 15 Airports in California 
   in 2010 9
8. Summary of Enplanements of Top 10 California Airports in 2010 11
9. Subsidy Rates for California Essential Air Service Airports 30
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
xii List of Tables
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report looks at the development challenges facing airports in the state of California. 
After deregulation of the US aviation industry in 1978, the major airlines focused their 
efforts on building up operations at core hub airports, usually at the major or close-to-major 
economic centers of activity. They used commuter airlines with smaller planes to feed 
flights from smaller communities into these hubs, creating the hub-and-spoke system.
The hub-and-spoke system was efficient for the airlines that thrived, as they were able to 
consolidate their resources at a few major airports. However this led to traffic stagnating 
and declining at airports close to those hubs. These airports are usually referred to as 
secondary airports. Metropolitan planning agencies, managers of the secondary airports, 
and city and state officials have long advocated for a more even allocation of flights across 
airports in their regions to reduce and manage congestion at the primary airports. The 
legacy airlines, however, had invested heavily in developing infrastructure at the large 
hubs, and it did not make economic sense to invest in other airports.
The secondary airports were thus left with excess capacity as the primary hubs grew 
congested. Residents living close to these secondary airports frequently bypass them, 
driving long distances, to catch flights at hubs with more frequent flights and nonstop 
flights to more destinations.
The past ten years have seen the rapid growth of a new category of airline in the US 
market. The airlines in this new category are generically referred to as low-cost carriers 
(LCC). These airlines work very hard to keep their operating costs low so they can pass on 
the savings to passengers in the form of low fares. A key component of the cost-minimizing 
strategy of LCCs has been the use of secondary airports. Using secondary airports allows 
the LCCs to negotiate cheaper aeronautical fees with the airports, avoid the congestion 
at the hubs, and also avoid having to battle with the legacy airlines at hubs for limited 
resources, such as gates, among others. This has generated significant demand at the 
secondary airports, exactly what the planners, and local and state officials had longed for.
This report is a focused study of the airport system in the state of California, looking at how 
the operations of the LCCs are impacting the development of secondary airports in the state. 
Three of California’s busier secondary airports (Oakland, Ontario, and Bob Hope airports) 
stated in interviews that noise impacts and expansion are their key challenges. Initiation of 
LCC operations has generated significant demand at these airports. Traffic at Long Beach 
airport more than doubled in less than a year once JetBlue initiated operations. Oakland, 
Ontario, Bob Hope, and airports where Southwest Airlines has initiated traffic have all 
seen significant traffic growth. The growth, however, has turned out to be a double-edged 
sword, leading to more noise and environmental pollution. The result has been complaints 
from residents in the surrounding communities.
The pushback from residents on noise from aircraft operations is now a key constraint 
in the ability of the LCCs to grow their traffic at these airports. Airport officials admit 
there is no easy fix to the noise pollution problem. At Bob Hope Airport they have moved 
proactively to engage with the community and implement curfews and rules of operations 
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so aircraft noise is kept to a minimum. At Long Beach the city initially imposed a very 
stringent noise ordinance but was forced to relax the restrictions after the airlines mounted 
a legal challenge.
The LCCs have begun to slowly initiate flights out of the large hubs. In the recent economic 
downturn some of them actually increased their flights at the large hubs and cut back on 
flights at the secondary airports. The secondary airports are now faced with the challenge 
of fighting to retain the LCCs at their ports while placating the neighboring residents and 
communities. If the current trend continues and the LCCs transition a large proportion of 
their flights to the large hubs, they could potentially reverse the gains in passenger traffic 
that the secondary airports have experienced during the growth of the LCCs.
This report also looks at smaller airports and the opportunity for them to use very light 
jets (VLJ) as an on-demand service. The authors estimate that the cost of on-demand jet 
service fares to travelers in smaller communities will be out of reach for even business 
travelers. The authors do believe it may be possible in select locations to utilize spare 
capacity of corporate aircraft to meet the needs of business travelers in some of the smaller 
communities.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
The past ten years have seen the rapid growth of a new category of airline in the US 
market. The airlines in this new category are generically referred to as low-cost carriers 
(LCC). They are so-named because a major component of their operating strategy has 
been to keep costs low and pass on the savings to customers in the form of low fares. 
Southwest Airlines is the pioneer and the most successful LCC airline in the US. Southwest 
has gained so much market share, in fact, that at the end of the first quarter of 2012, it was 
the largest US domestic carrier, excluding international passengers. A key component of 
the cost-minimizing strategy of LCC has been the use of secondary airports. This strategy 
allows them to negotiate cheaper aeronautical fees, avoid the congestion at hubs, and 
also avoid having to battle legacy airlines at the hubs for limited resources, such as gates, 
among others.
Until recently, the airlines operating hub-and-spoke networks (usually referred to as legacy 
airlines or carriers) have dominated the airline industry. These legacy airlines sought to 
gain competitive advantage by building large-scale hub-and-spoke networks with high 
departure frequencies and aggressive ticket pricing strategies. As far back as 1972, 
Fruhan1 had empirically demonstrated that a passenger airline’s regional market share 
has a strong correlation to the frequency of its flights. Hence, the modus operandi of the 
airlines has been to concentrate as many flights as possible (with high frequencies) at their 
hubs to ensure they capture the bulk of passenger traffic.
The majority of the hub airports are located close to the major metropolitan regions in the 
US, as they tend to be the centers of economic activity and generators of passenger traffic. 
The concentration of flights created by this competitive environment has resulted in cases 
in which secondary airports close to primary airports are left with excess capacity while 
the primary hub grows increasingly congested. Residents living close to these secondary 
airports frequently bypass them, driving up to two hours to catch flights at the primary 
hubs because they offer a larger number of destinations, cheaper fares and more frequent 
departures. Aviation literature typically refers to this phenomenon as “airport leakage.”
Efforts by planners, airport operators and authorities to convince the legacy carriers to 
spread flights across regional airports have not been successful for a variety of reasons that 
will be discussed later in this report. The primary hub airports are experiencing constraints 
accommodating gradually increasing aircraft operations on their existing facilities (runways 
and taxiways). They, however, find it difficult to make capacity improvements, such as 
adding runways, due to limited financial resources, stringent environmental requirements 
and community opposition. The large hubs are slowly becoming a bottleneck in the 
national airspace system. Despite their current capacity limitations, it is worth noting that 
the NextGen program being rolled out by the FAA contains several elements aimed at 
improving capacity of the major commercial service airports to serve increased traffic while 
minimizing the impact of operations on neighboring communities. 
Though LCCs operate through point-to-point networks, they still need to be close to high-
density markets; therefore, they select only those secondary airports that are close to 
metropolitan areas. The LCCs’ preference for secondary airports has implications for 
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small(er) airports that are outside major metropolitan areas. Those such as Monterey 
Airport in Northern California and McClellan-Palomar in Southern California continue to 
experience significant airport leakage as local residents bypass them to access primary 
and LLC-serviced secondary airports more than two hours’ drive from their communities. 
Traffic has been so low at these smaller airports that some would be unable to maintain 
scheduled airline service without subsidies, such as the Essential Air Service Program.2
This report is a focused study of the airport system in the state of California, looking at how 
the operations of the legacy airlines and LCC impact the development of secondary airports 
in the state. The objective is to identify the key factors driving the dynamics of airport 
selection by airlines – especially the LCCs – and use this information to identify policies 
and measures that planners can use to guide the development of secondary airports. The 
review also looks at the smaller airports that are too far from the major metropolitan areas 
to be attractive to LCCs and examines their options for growing and sustaining traffic. The 
report is developed based on a review of literature and interviews with public officials at 
selected airports in California.
The next section is a broad overview of how low-cost carriers have become integrated 
and grown in the California airport system, followed by a review of secondary airports with 
low-cost carrier presence and a look at one secondary airport that has spare capacity. 
Some of the key airports were unable to grant interviews; so the authors relied heavily on 
published statistics. The report also includes the results of interviews with two relatively 
small airports experiencing airport leakage and discusses some opportunities they could 
explore to attract traffic. The information gathered from the interviews, publications and 
analyses are used to develop recommendations for steps the airports should be taking to 
improve and sustain airline traffic.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE CALIFORNIA AIRPORT SYSTEM
Three of California’s major airports – Los Angeles International, San Francisco International 
and San Diego – consistently rank among the top 30 hub airports in the United States. As 
of 2012, there are 246 public-use airports, in California, of which 214 are privately owned. 
Air traffic in California is concentrated at a small number of the 246 airports. Table 1 shows 
that approximately 75 percent of the airline traffic is concentrated in the top five of the 
state’s airports.
Table 2 was generated using enplanement data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
T100 Domestic tables for the top 15 California airports. The data shows that almost 90 
percent of the traffic is concentrated at the first seven airports. The high concentration of 
flights at these airports leads to high levels of congestion, especially during peak travel 
seasons. Any minor spike or disruption at those facilities during peak periods tends to 
cascade through the national air space system in the form of delays and cancelations.
Aviation administrators and planners have long sought to reduce this concentration of 
traffic with little success. A classic example occurred in 1992 when the US government 
established rules for flights out of Regan National limiting frequency and limiting destination 
distances to 1,000 miles to encourage airlines to shift traffic to Washington Dulles. Legacy 
airlines circumvented the rule by rerouting long-haul domestic flights through hubs that 
within that radius, and rerouting international flights through JFK in New York instead 
of nearby Washington Dulles.3 The operating paradigm and structure of legacy airlines 
means they tend to favor large airports and plan to increase capacity at existing airports 
rather than moving operations to secondary airports.
Table 1. 2010 Passenger Enplanements at Primary US Airports (Adapted from 
FAA Website)
Rank State Airport Code City Airport Name Y2010
1  GA  ATL  Atlanta Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta International 43,130,585
2  IL  ORD  Chicago Chicago O’Hare International 32,171,831
3  CA  LAX  Los Angeles Los Angeles International 28,857,755
4  TX  DFW  Fort Worth Dallas/Fort Worth International 27,100,656
5  CO  DEN  Denver Denver International 25,241,962
6  NY  JFK  New York John F. Kennedy International 22,934,047
7  TX  IAH  Houston George Bush Intercontinental/Houston 19,528,631
8  CA  SFO  San Francisco San Francisco International 19,359,003
9  NV  LAS  Las Vegas McCarran International 18,996,738
10  AZ  PHX  Phoenix Phoenix Sky Harbor International 18,907,171
11  NC  CLT  Charlotte Charlotte/Douglas International 18,629,181
12  FL  MIA  Miami Miami International 17,017,654
13  FL  MCO  Orlando Orlando International 17,017,491
14  NJ  EWR  Newark Newark Liberty International 16,571,754
15  MI  DTW  Detroit Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County 15,643,890
16  MN  MSP  Minneapolis Minneapolis-St. Paul International/ Wold-Chamberlain 15,512,487
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Overview of the California Airport System
Rank State Airport Code City Airport Name Y2010
17  WA  SEA  Seattle Seattle-Tacoma International 15,406,243
18  PA  PHL  Philadelphia Philadelphia International 14,951,254
19  MA  BOS  Boston General Edward Lawrence Logan International 13,561,814
20  NY  LGA  New York La Guardia 12,001,501
21  VA  IAD  Dulles Washington Dulles International 11,276,481
22  MD  BWI  Glen Burnie Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshal 10,848,633
23  FL  FLL  Fort Lauderdale Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International 10,829,810
24  UT  SLC  Salt Lake City Salt Lake City International 9,910,493
25  HI  HNL  Honolulu Honolulu International 8,740,077
26  VA  DCA  Arlington Ronald Reagan Washington National 8,736,804
27  IL  MDW  Chicago Chicago Midway International 8,518,957
28  CA  SAN  San Diego San Diego International 8,430,509
29  FL  TPA  Tampa Tampa International 8,137,222
30  OR  PDX  Portland Portland International 6,582,227
Total for All Commercial Service Airports 712,025,632
Total for Top 30 Airports  504,552,861
Table 2. Cumulative Flight Distribution Among Top 15 Airports in California 
(2010 Enplanements)
Airport Airport ID 2010 (% Enplanements)
Cumulative                        
(% Enplanements)
Los Angeles International LAX 30% 30%
San Francisco International SFO 22% 52%
San Diego International SAN 12% 64%
Oakland International OAK 7% 70%
Sacramento International SMF 6% 77%
Orange County/John Wayne SNA 6% 83%
San José International SJC 6% 89%
Ontario International ONT 3% 92%
Burbank/Glendale/Pasadena BUR 3% 95%
Long Beach Municipal LGB 2% 97%
Palm Springs Regional PSP 1% 98%
Fresno Yosemite International FAT 1% 99%
Santa Barbara Municipal SBA 1% 100%
Monterey Peninsula MRY 0% 100%
San Luis Obispo SBP 0% 100%
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III. LOW-COST CARRIERS AT CALIFORNIA AIRPORTS
LOW-COST CARRIER DOMINANCE AT SECONDARY AIRPORTS IN 
METROPOLITAN REGIONS
Part of the cost-minimizing strategy of the LCC has been to operate out of secondary 
airports close to urban areas instead of the existing major airports. In California, Southwest 
and JetBlue airlines have fueled growth at Oakland and Long Beach airport, respectively. 
The LCCs’ share of passenger traffic has grown steadily from 7 percent in 1990 to 20 
percent in 20004 and was estimated to be at 50 percent by 2005.5 It is becoming clear that 
LCCs are likely to dominate air traffic in the future.
Tables 3 through 7 show the rank of the top five airlines at each of the 15 airports in 
California from 1990 to 2010 (at 5 year intervals). The data was processed from the T100 
database.6 (The airline codes for Southwest and JetBlue are WN and B6, respectively.)
Table 3. Ranking of Top 5 Airlines by Enplanements at Top 15 Airports in 
California in 1990
Airport Name Airport ID Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
Los Angeles International LAX UA DL AA US CO
San Francisco International SFO UA US AA DL CO
San Diego International SAN US WN AA UA HP
San José International SJC AA US UA HP DL
Oakland International OAK UA WN US HP AS
Ontario International ONT UA AA WN HP DL
Orange County/John Wayne SNA AA US HP CO NW
Sacramento International SMF UA AA US DL OE
Burbank/Glendale/Pasadena BUR US WN HP UA AA
Long Beach Municipal LGB AS HP AA UA DL
Fresno Yosemite International FAT OE DL UA HP US
Palm Springs Regional PSP AA AS OE UA HP
Santa Barbara Municipal SBA UA AA OE HP  
Monterey Peninsula MRY OE UA US   
Bakersfield Meadows Field BFL AA OE HP   
Notes: 
• In 1990, Southwest ranked only second and third out of five of the top fifteen airports in the state.
• Note: WN: Southwest Airlines, B6: JetBlue Airways (See legend for other airline codes below).
Airline Codes for Tables 3 through 7
AA – American Airlines G4 – Allegiant Air UA – United Airlines
AS – Alaska Airlines HA – Hawaiian Airlines US – US Airways
B6 – JetBlue Airways MQ – American Eagle WN – Southwest Airlines
CO – Continental Airlines OO – Skywest Airlines YV – Mesa Airlines
DL – Delta Airlines QX – Horizon Air YX – Republic Airlines
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Table 4. Ranking of Top 5 Airlines by Enplanements at Top 15 Airports in 
California in 1995
Airport Name Airport ID Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
Los Angeles International LAX UA WN DL AA CO
San Francisco International SFO UA AA DL CO NW
San Diego International SAN WN UA AA DL HP
Oakland International OAK WN UA AS HP DL
San José International SJC WN QQ AA AS UA
Orange County/John Wayne SNA UA HP AA WN AS
Sacramento International SMF WN UA HP AA DL
Ontario International ONT WN UA HP DL AA
Burbank/Glendale/Pasadena BUR WN UA AS HP AA
Palm Springs Regional PSP AA AS UA  AX
Fresno Yosemite International FAT DL AA AX  YV
Long Beach Municipal LGB HP  AS   
Santa Barbara Municipal SBA UA ZW  AX MQ
Monterey Peninsula MRY UA AX  YV MQ
Bakersfield Meadows Field BFL AA  YV   
Note: Five years after previous measurement, Southwest was present at eight of the top fifteen airports in the state.
Table 5. Ranking of Top 5 Airlines by Enplanements at Top 15 Airports in 
California in 2000
Airport Name Airport ID Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
Los Angeles International LAX UA AA WN DL NW
San Francisco International SFO UA AA DL NW CO
San Diego International SAN WN UA AA DL HP
San José International SJC WN AA UA AS HP
Oakland International OAK WN UA AS AA HP
Sacramento International SMF WN UA HP DL AS
Orange County/John Wayne SNA AA UA HP WN AS
Ontario International ONT WN UA DL HP AS
Burbank/Glendale/Pasadena BUR WN UA AS HP AA
Palm Springs Regional PSP AS AA UA MQ NW
Long Beach Municipal LGB AA HP G4   
Santa Barbara Municipal SBA UA MQ ZW  XP
Fresno Yosemite International FAT MQ QX AA G4  
Monterey Peninsula MRY MQ  UA   
San Luis Obispo SBP MQ     
Note: By 2000, Southwest t ranked first at six of the top fifteen California airports.
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Table 6. Ranking of Top 5 Airlines by Enplanements at Top 15 Airports in 
California in 2005
Airport Name Airport ID Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
Los Angeles International LAX AA UA WN DL OO
San Francisco International SFO UA AA OO DL NW
San Diego International SAN WN UA AA DL HP
Oakland International OAK WN B6 AS UA HP
Sacramento International SJC WN AA AS UA MQ
Orange County/John Wayne SMF WN UA HP DL AA
San José International SNA WN AA AS UA HP
Ontario International ONT WN DL HP AA UA
Burbank/Glendale/Pasadena BUR WN OO AA AS HP
Long Beach Municipal LGB B6 AA AS YV  
Palm Springs Regional PSP AS OO AA YV NW
Fresno Yosemite International FAT OO YV AA QX MQ
Santa Barbara Municipal SBA OO YV MQ QX  
Monterey Peninsula MRY OO YV MQ   
San Luis Obispo SBP OO YV MQ   
Note: By 2005, Southwest dominance grows and JetBlue is first and second at Long Beach and Oakland. 
Table 7. Ranking of Top 5 Airlines by Enplanements at Top 15 Airports in 
California in 2010
Airport Name Airport ID Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
Los Angeles International LAX AA UA WN DL OO
San Francisco International SFO UA AA WN OO DL
San Diego International SAN WN DL UA AA US
Oakland International OAK WN B6 AS US HA
Sacramento International SMF WN DL UA OO US
Orange County/John Wayne SNA WN AA DL UA AS
San José International SJC WN AS AA US OO
Ontario International ONT WN AA US OO CO
Burbank/Glendale/Pasadena BUR WN OO AA B6 AS
Long Beach Municipal LGB B6 OO YV QX YX
Palm Springs Regional PSP OO AS AA YV G4
Fresno Yosemite International FAT OO YV AA MQ QX
Santa Barbara Municipal SBA OO YV AA QX YX
Monterey Peninsula MRY OO MQ AA G4  
San Luis Obispo SBP OO YV    
Note: By 2010, Southwest airlines ranks first at seven of the top fifteen airports, and JetBlue ranks first, second and 
          fourth.
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The information in Tables 3 through 7 illustrates how LLC Southwest airlines has gone 
from being the second- and third-ranked airline at four airports to the dominant airline at 
seven of California’s top 15 airports.
JetBlue, another LLC, has also grown tremendously. It currently dominates Long Beach 
and is the number two airline in terms of domestic passengers at Oakland airport. Given the 
above trend it will not be surprising if five years from now Southwest airlines is in second 
place at either Los Angeles or San Francisco international airports. Even without dominating 
these two airports, Southwest airlines is the dominant carrier in the state (see Table 8).
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In summary, LCCs are currently the key drivers of growth of secondary airports, but in the 
near future they are poised to become the dominant carriers in the US. If LCCs become 
the dominant clients of airports in the future, then appropriate planning for secondary 
airports will require planners and airports to understand the needs and behavior of this 
new provider group.
One of the key ways secondary airports partner with LCC airlines has been negotiating 
terms of agreements for use of their facilities. This typically involves some form of reduced 
landing fees and passenger guarantees offered to the airline as an incentive. Once the 
initial agreement phase ends and the projected demand in the form of passenger traffic 
materialize both parties begin to focus on more permanent measures. The next major 
step usually involves an upgrade of the terminal the airline is operating from, or, in some 
cases, construction of a new terminal, usually financed by the airline. At Oakland airport, 
Southwest airlines invested in the development of Terminal B, and JetBlue recently 
completed Terminal 5 at JFK airport in New York.
A COST-SENSITIVE APPROACH TO INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS AT 
AIRPORTS 
One of the areas where LCCs differ from legacy airlines is in how they invest in airport 
terminals. In contrast to the elaborate and sophisticated architectural designs at major 
hubs, LCCs place an emphasis on both utility and cost and tend to favor simple designs.
In a review of Gensler (architects) experience in building terminals for both Southwest and 
JetBlue at MacArthur-Islip, and JFK Terminal 5, the emphasis was on utility and keeping costs 
down.7 Both airlines wanted to avoid the “grand ticketing hall” and opted to focus more on 
the post-security-check portion of the terminal. This was based on their perception that their 
passengers tend to arrive earlier, stay closer to their gates, spend more of their time in the post-
security sections, and spend more money at concessions (since most LLCs offer reduced 
inflight services).  This assumption is documented in recent airport studies that indicate that 
passengers are spending more at concessions for a variety of reasons, including airline 
cutbacks on inflight amenities, longer average trip lengths, and increased security measures.8 
In the drive to keep costs low, LCCs tend to limit the amount they will spend building up 
space for concessions; they provide only what is necessary to meet the needs of their 
passengers.9
The reduced spending leads to lower costs for the airlines, which they pass on to passengers 
as lower fares; however, the approach of focusing on post-security passengers leads to 
limited amenities and options for terminal users who are not traveling (for example, those 
waiting to pick up or drop off travelers). Airport managers and developers need to consider 
the potential loss of revenue from ignoring or paying less attention to this group of airport 
users.
The LCCs also opt for simpler gate layouts, as they usually have a uniform fleet with only 
one or two aircraft types. Their high-volume operations and low aircraft turnaround times 
also mean that passenger loads per gate can be as high as 600,000, compared to 300,000 
for legacy airlines.10 This implies a high demand on restrooms, furniture and facilities in 
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the gate area. LLCs therefore opt for more durable finishes. Accordingly, they also choose 
polished and hardened concrete flooring instead of terrazzo. 
LCCs are examining all the minute details to minimize costs, even opting for no finishes 
under their baggage claim devices since passengers cannot see that surface. Cost is not 
their only criteria though; they are also concerned about passengers’ experience. JetBlue 
insisted that restrooms at JFK Terminal 5 be designed in such a way that half of them 
could be taken out of service for cleaning while the other half remained open. Also, to 
accommodate the high volume of passengers, more restrooms were located on the right-
hand side of arriving passengers to avoid oncoming traffic.
The type of infrastructure investments LCC are willing to make during their tenure at 
secondary airports should be proactively used by planners as they plan upgrades at 
existing airports.
EFFICIENT OPERATIONS AT AIRPORTS
Although minimizing costs has been the key competitive advantage of LCCs, this is not 
their only key strength. The legacy airlines learned this in a painful way as they attempted 
to compete with the LCCs by creating subsidiary low-cost clones (Ted, Song, etc.). Most 
of these subsidiaries failed miserably because they competed only on fares and ignored 
other key LCC strategies. In addition to keeping their costs down, low-cost airlines have 
aggressively managed various aspects of their operations for efficiency. For example, 
they have very short turnaround times at their gates, maintain high on-time reliability, have 
built strong collaborative relationships with their workers’ unions, and implemented several 
structures to keep their employees motivated. Their location at secondary airports gives 
them various advantages, such as reduced congestion and fast turnaround times for their 
aircraft as well as the ability to negotiate low fees and charges with airport authorities 
eager to attract traffic. 
RISKS OF FOCUSING ON LOW-COST CARRIERS
We do note that LCC airlines are not all the same. In the recent economic down turn two of 
the major low-cost airlines serving Oakland, ATA Airlines and Aloha Airlines failed. Around 
the same time Skybus Airlines that had recently begun service at Oakland also failed. 
Several of the legacy airlines also consolidated their operations by moving flights from 
Oakland to San Francisco. The net effect was a 30 percent loss in traffic to the Airport. In 
interviews with other airports in the Bay Area during this study, they had noted that low-
cost carriers can be a double edged sword, as some legacy airlines could stop service if 
they decide it is not worth staying and competing with an expanding low-cost airline. The 
net effect is then a high frequency of flights to a few specific destinations (via the LCC) and 
a loss of connection to several destinations the legacy carrier used to provide.
Going forward, airports will need to become much smarter at evaluating airlines in order 
to match their markets to the right airline type. If they lack the capacity, airports should 
consider hiring experienced air service development consultants to assist with market 
analysis. The upfront cost of a quality assessment of the market and evaluating of potential 
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partner airlines is well worth the expense to prevent the situation of ending up with an 
upgraded or expensive terminal down the line with no airline to utilize it. For example, 
though an airline like Allegiant with a focus on providing access to tourist destinations may 
be attractive to a secondary airport, it may not be the best match for, say, San José if the 
airport authorities think their key priority should be serving the business travelers of Silicon 
Valley.
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IV. SECONDARY AIRPORTS WITH SIGNIFICANT LOW-COST 
CARRIER PRESENCE
To get a better idea of the issues airports in the state are grappling with, we approached staff 
of airports for interviews. The airports were selected to give a good geographic coverage 
of the states, a broad mix of secondary and smaller airports, and airports with significant 
low-cost presence and those without. We initially contacted seven airports, Oakland, San 
José, Monterey, and Concord airports in northern California and Long Beach, Bob Hope, 
and McClellan-Palomar in southern California. We were able to interview five of them 
during the study, San José, Concord, Long Beach, Bob Hope, and McClellan-Palomar.
In addition to the airports, we also interviewed the aviation regional planners at the 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) and the Southern California Association 
of Governments (SCAG), the two metropolitan planning agencies in both regions. In the 
following sections we present a summary of our findings on the challenges the airports are 
dealing with. We start with Long Beach and Bob Hope, two airports with significant low-
cost carrier presence.
LONG BEACH AIRPORT: A FOCUS CITY AIRPORT FOR JETBLUE
Long Beach Airport is located in southern California and is about 17 miles southeast of Los 
Angeles International Airport. Owned by the City of Long Beach, the airport and currently 
provides both commercial and general aviation services to the community. Currently, 
scheduled commercial air service is provided by Alaska Airlines, Delta Airlines, JetBlue 
Airways, Frontier Airlines and US Airways. In addition to the scheduled airlines, the airport 
receives significant general aviation activity, with a little over 300 aircraft based on its field.
Growth and Expansion
Long Beach Airport provides an example of how low-cost airlines have impacted traffic 
at secondary airports over the past two decades. As illustrated in Figure 1, Long Beach 
airport has seen phenomenal traffic growth since JetBlue initiated operations in 2001. 
Prior to 2002, passenger traffic had been holding steady in the range of 700,000 annual 
enplanements. Once JetBlue began offering service in 2002, enplanements jumped 
from 708,686 to 1,401,039 within a year. In the FAA compiled rankings for passenger 
enplanements, Long Beach Airport moved from a rank of 93 to 72 in 2010.
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Figure 1. Enplanements Highlighting Impact of Southwest Entry at Long Beach 
Airport
Noise ordinances imposed by the city of Long Beach constrain each commercial carrier 
at Long Beach Airport to a maximum of 41 flights per day and commuter airlines to a 
maximum of 25 flights per day.11 Airlines may exceed those flight caps if they can show 
noise from aircraft operations will not exceed the baseline CNEL* budget limits set in the 
baseline year in the ordinance (see Figure 2). The ordinance also restricts commercial 
flights to the hours between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. The current noise ordinance is shown in 
Figure 2. The ordinance was passed as part of an out-of-court settlement between the 
city and the airlines after the city had initially tried to impose a limit of 15 flights per day in 
1983.12 The airlines challenged the city in court, and after multiple rulings and appeals, the 
dispute was settled out of court in 1995.
* Community Noise Equivalent Level (in decibels) is a noise metric developed in California that is based on 
   hourly noise levels from three periods of the day; 0700-1900, 1900-2200 and 2200-0700 hours. The 
   explicit formula is defined in the Caltrans State Noise Standards (http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/planning/aero 
   naut/documents/statenoisestnds.pdf).
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E. Air Carrier Flights
1. Air Carriers shall be permitted to operate not less than forty-one flights per day, the number 
of flights authorized on November 5, 1990. Pending assessment of compliance with the CNEL 
budget applicable to Air Carriers, Flights by these users shall not be increased above the number 
permitted as of November 5, 1990. 
2. In order to achieve applicable noise budgets, users within the Air Carrier category will be encouraged 
to operate at the lowest average noise level consistent with safety. This encouragement will be 
provided by permitting increases in the number of allowed Air Carrier Flights if the Air Carrier 
user group achieves compliance with the CNEL budget established pursuant to this Chapter, as 
determined on an annual basis. 
3. Flights which are available for use, but which are unallocated at the time this Chapter becomes 
effective, shall be allocated on a first-come, first-served basis. Allocations of Flights which are 
sought by more than one user shall be determined by lottery. 
4. The Airport Manager shall determine, at the end of the fourth calendar quarter following 
implementation of this Chapter, whether additional Flights may be allocated to Air Carriers based 
on the cumulative noise generated by Air Carrier Operations during the prior twelve month period. 
Additional Flights above those permitted under Subsection E.1 shall be awarded only to the extent 
the Airport Manager determines that initiation of service utilizing those Flights will not lead the Air 
Carriers, as a group, to exceed the level established pursuant to Section 16.43.050.C. 
5. Flights allocated by the Airport Manager pursuant to Subsection E.4 shall be awarded for a period 
of one year. In the event the Airport Manager determines (a) that implementation of Flights awarded 
under Subsection E.4 has resulted in air carrier cumulative noise in excess of the Air Carrier 
noise budget and (b) that overall aircraft noise exceeds the level allowed by Section 16.43.050.A, 
the Airport Manager shall revoke such of the Flight awards granted under Subsection E.4 as the 
Airport Manager determines must be revoked in order to achieve compliance with the Air Carrier 
noise budget. In making this determination, the first Flights awarded under Subsection E.4 to be 
eliminated with be those of the operators with the highest average noise levels per Flight during 
the prior twelve months. In the event that equal priorities exist, the Airport Manager shall conduct 
a lottery to determine which Flights shall be eliminated. In order to minimize Air Carrier noise, all 
Air Carrier Operations shall be conducted by aircraft which comply with the standards of FAR Part 
36 Stage 3 and all operations shall be scheduled between the hours of seven A.M. and ten P.M.
Figure 2. City of Long Beach Municipal Noise Ordinance 1995
 
The airport has three runways. Runway 12/30 – the longest of the three at 10,000 feet – is 
the main runway for air carrier operations. It runs from the northwest to southeast end of 
the airport and intersects with parallel runways 7L-25R (6,192 ft.) and 7R-25L (5,423 ft.). 
Runways 34L/16R and 34R/16 run north-south and intersect the other three runways.
The airport is currently operating close to capacity and all available gates and departure 
slots have been taken up by operating airlines. Allegiant Air and Frontier Airlines served 
the airport until 2011. When they left, Allegiant Air slots were allotted to JetBlue, while 
Frontier’s three slots were allocated to JetBlue, Delta and US Airways. Demand for air 
services at the airport remains robust, with all the major carriers showing load factors 
greater than 80 percent in 2011.13
The noise restrictions are the largest impediments to growth at the airport. As a result 
of this constraint, even though JetBlue has designated Long Beach a “focus city,” it now 
operates several flights out of Los Angeles International airport since there is no room to 
expand operations at Long Beach. 
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During interviews, airport officials mentioned that curfews, noise restrictions and availability 
of slots were a key constraint on the expansion of services at the airport. They were, 
however, cognizant of the impact of aircraft operations on the community, and the airport 
was exploring various innovative techniques to mitigate the noise impact. One option 
being investigated is the Advanced Continuous Descent Approach, which, in addition to 
minimizing fuel consumption, reduces noise impacts. It involves keeping arriving aircraft at 
their cruise altitude for longer than conventional approaches, and then having them make a 
continuous descent to the runway at idle or near-idle thrust with no level flight segments.14 
The procedure was developed by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and Georgia Tech in collaboration with FAA and NASA. The airport has an active noise 
abatement program that seeks to engage with the community.
BOB HOPE AIRPORT: SECONDARY AIRPORT CAPTIVE TO SELF-IMPOSED 
NOISE RESTRICTION
Bob Hope airport, usually referred to as Burbank Airport, is in fact jointly owned by the 
cities of Burbank, Glendale and Pasadena. Located in Southern California, the airport is in 
and is about 40 minutes’ drive from Los Angeles International Airport when traffic is light.
In addition to scheduled commercial and general aviation operators, both FedEx and UPS 
operate air cargo flights out of the airport. Both of the airport’s two runways – 15/33 at 
6,885 feet and 8/26 at 5,802 feet – are used for scheduled airline operations.
Currently, scheduled commercial air service is provided by Alaska Airlines, JetBlue Airways, 
SkyWest, Southwest Airlines and US Airways. General aviation traffic at the airport is 
moderate, with 91 based aircraft. Forty-five percent of the aircraft operations at the airport 
are from scheduled commercial airlines.
In discussions with the authors of this report, the airport manager said that the airport 
has an anti-growth pact with the city of Burbank in which it has agreed not to expand the 
airport and is proactively engaging the community in all airport plans. The airport works 
collaboratively and proactively to ensure the noise impacts of aircraft operations on the 
community are minimized. Bob Hope airport has imposed its own noise curfews from 10 
p.m. to 7 a.m. on aircraft used by scheduled airlines. Violation of the nighttime curfew 
carries a penalty of $3,953 per violation. The airport has a set of rules it expects aircraft 
operators to abide by. Unlike Long Beach, the rules resulted from a collaborative process 
between the airport and the towns rather than as a settlement arising out of litigation.
The airport is currently close to capacity and is dominated by Southwest Airlines which 
had close to 66 percent market share of the traffic in 2010. With JetBlue now serving Bob 
Hope, the airport becomes one of the few airports with two low-cost carriers. The airport 
is landlocked, and there is no space to expand on the airside. Also, residents in nearby 
communities have actively opposed measures to extend the runway and have been very 
vocal whenever additional aircraft operations are added.
The airport is in a similar situation to Long Beach and in the near future may lose some of 
the flights it has gained to Los Angeles International airport if the low-cost carriers want to 
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grow their market share. Like Long Beach, it is in a precarious position since the drive to 
LAX is not that far for Southern Californians accustomed to navigating the second-largest 
metropolitan area in the US. As documented in the study by Kanafani and Mahmoud, 
airports in the close vicinity of large hubs always find it hard to retain air service over the 
long term due to the ability of the large hub to offer a wider variety of destinations and 
competitive fares.
SUMMARY
The airports in the state that have been able to attract low-cost carriers have all experienced 
significant growth in traffic. The biggest challenge they face with the growth in demand is 
the noise impact of increased aircraft operations on residents in the surrounding areas. 
The city of Long Beach had an initial adversarial relationship with the tenant airlines, which 
resulted in litigation settled out of court. Bob Hope, on the other hand proactively agreed 
to self-imposed nighttime restrictions and flight curfews to maintain relationships with the 
community.
In the absence of new technology that will significantly reduce the noise from aircraft 
operations, engaging with the surrounding community is the best way to deal with noise 
impacts. Airports, such as Bob Hope, that adopt a proactive stance and engage with the 
community early on, are likely to face less developmental challenges and avoid the dollar 
and time cost of litigation. Airports interested in attracting low-cost carriers should consider 
both the environmental and noise impacts from increased service early on and incorporate 
this and the cost of the necessary mitigation measures into their business development 
plans.
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V. SECONDARY AIRPORTS WITH LIMITED/NO LOW-COST 
CARRIER PRESENCE
The airport in San José, California, makes an interesting study because it is a classic case 
of a secondary airport located in a region with significant travel demand that nonetheless 
struggles to retain traffic because it is in the shadow of a large well-developed international 
airport – in this case, San Francisco International. The airport recently spent a significant 
sum to modernize and upgrade one of its terminals, but instead of the expected growth, it 
actually lost a key major airline, and passenger traffic remains low despite the presence of 
several high-profile technology companies in its core cities. The case study looks at how 
the master planning development approach has impacted the airport and what it is doing 
to attract traffic.
MINETA SAN JOSÉ INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: AN AIRPORT WITH SPARE 
CAPACITY
Norman Y. Mineta San José International airport (SJC) in San José, California, is one of 
the three major airports in the Bay Area. The airport is located very close to downtown 
San José in the heart of Silicon Valley. It sits in the shadow of Oakland (OAK) and San 
Francisco (SFO) airports to the north, but its predominant leakage is to San Francisco, 
which offers cheaper fares and a wide selection of destinations with higher frequencies. 
Annual passenger enplanements in 2010 were four million, down from six million ten years 
ago. The landlocked nature of the airport and its close proximity to downtown, coupled with 
the path of its flight tracks, limit its future growth.
The airport recently completed expansion and modernization of one of its terminals, 
‘Terminal B,’ at a cost of $1.3 billion and has been facing challenges attracting enough 
passenger traffic. Though Oakland airport may not impact SJC significantly, the presence 
of Southwest Airlines in Oakland ensures minimal leakage of traffic from the northern 
part of the East Bay to SJC. The airport has been hurt by the recent economic downturn. 
Conversations with officials indicate that they are concerned about the leakage issue and 
interested in conducting a leakage study to help quantify the extent of the leakage.
Attracting Air Service to the Airport
Going forward, SJC needs to work hard to attract traffic to justify the cost of investing in the 
terminal. The airport is actively exploring various markets where it can have a competitive 
edge. In line with this, it is actively engaged and partnering with business community 
leaders in Santa Clara and the local chamber of commerce to more clearly define their 
travel needs. In the process, it has conducted two rounds of surveys of businesses, which 
has helped identify key destinations the business community wants to access. As a result 
of the survey, the airport is working to attract air service to selected destinations in Asia (a 
core destination for Silicon Valley firms) and a few focus cities in Europe. Though this effort 
is laudable and a step in the right direction, strategically it should have expended more 
of its effort on business development prior to embarking on the extensive infrastructure 
upgrade instead of after the upgrade.
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In several publications, de Neufville has warned about the risks of investing in major 
infrastructure development at airports with the assumption that traffic will grow to utilize 
the spare capacity created.15,16,17 His key thesis has been that aviation forecasts used to 
make projections for terminal development projects have historically proven to be very 
unreliable. First, the demand for the aviation market is very susceptible (and correlated) 
to changes in the overall economy. Both nationwide events, such as a general economic 
slowdown, and location-specific events, such as shutdowns of local factories, could 
change the traffic that materializes at an airport. In addition, various factors, such as labor 
and fuel costs, mergers and regulations on aircraft type, influence the decisions of airlines 
on which airports to fly out of, and the number and type of aircraft operations they conduct 
at an airport.
The core underlying issue has been the master planning approach that sizes the terminal 
based on a single forecast that is assumed to be correct. Given the high level of uncertainty 
these factors impose on the validity of the forecasts, basing terminal development on the 
forecasts usually results in oversized and underutilized facilities that take a long time to 
reach their intended utilization projections.
De Neufville has advocated for a more flexible airport development approach. Where the 
terminal is sized based on a range of possible forecast scenarios (developed based on 
what-if analysis). The terminal(s) are then designed to be built-out in a phased manner 
in stages and the build-out plan is revisited and modified as the projected traffic does 
(or does not) materialize. In addition to this approach, a more critical point is the need to 
make sure that existing facilities are close to capacity before embarking on upgrades and 
construction of new facilities. In the case of San José (and, later, McClellan-Palomar), it 
appears the marketing to attract airlines to their facilities is being done after construction 
and not before. Given the substantial costs involved in upgrading terminals, airports need 
to closely examine this practice.
In various studies conducted by the Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission, 
SJC has been considered as a candidate reliever should SFO get congested in the future, 
but its landlocked geography and challenges mentioned earlier will be a constraint.18,19
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SYSTEM
In southern California there are several airports more than an hour’s drive from Los Angeles 
International and San Diego airports. These airports still face challenges in retaining traffic 
in their region, despite the distance to a major airport. McClellan-Palomar is a classic 
example. The authors were able to interview its staff during this study.
MCCLELLAN-PALOMAR AIRPORT: SMALL AIRPORT STRUGGLING TO 
ATTRACT AIR SERVICE
McClellan-Palomar in Carlsbad, California, is a typical example of an airport that faces the 
challenge of airport leakage even though it is not near any large airport. Twelve percent of 
the population in the region lives within an hour’s drive of the airport; however, most of this 
population still prefers to use airports outside the region.
An airport leakage analysis indicates more than 98 percent of potential travelers in 
Carlsbad do not use McClellan-Palomar for air travel. The study found that 76 percent of 
the population regularly drives to San Diego about 35 miles away, a trip that could take 
as long as an hour. Another 15 percent of the trips leak to Los Angeles Airport, which can 
be more than a two-hour drive in congested LA conditions. The key is that these airports 
are considerably larger and have more frequent flights and cheaper fares than McClellan-
Palomar.
In addition to being in the shadow of these larger airports with cheaper fares, McClellan-
Palomar’s situation is compounded by steadily decreasing seat capacity. The only 
commercial service flight, operated by SkyWest on behalf of United Express, reduced 
its daily service to Los Angeles International airport from six flights to five in July 2010. 
The airport recently completed a modernization of its terminal at a cost of $24 million. 
The modernization effort included a new state-of-the-art terminal building with a customs 
station and new passenger bag screening facilities. A new restaurant has been constructed 
adjacent to the terminal building. Other improvements at the airport include a new storm 
water cleaning system, upgraded ramp storage space, public parking, and new firefighting 
truck and equipment. The airport has several fixed-base operators with on-site offices. 
The provision of the restaurant will serve both commercial travelers and other tenants and 
users of the airport.
Like San José, the airport invested in a terminal though it did not have a clearly identified 
and impending market of travelers. It now faces a similar challenge of attracting air service 
to justify the investment. In 2010 the airport applied for a Small Community Air Service 
Development Program (SCASDP) grant of $500,000 which it intended to match with 
local funds of $50,000 to provide incentives to Horizon Air to operate out of the airport. 
The SCASDP program is a pilot project established by Congress in 2000 to help small 
communities enhance their air service. The program was authorized as part of the Wendell 
H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century and was re-authorized 
through 2008.20 Horizon Air has indicated interest in initiating service from the airport to 
San José International. The entire $500,000 federal grant was to be used as a revenue 
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guarantee and to cover startup costs, while the $50,000 will be used for marketing and 
advertising. San José was chosen because the Bay Area is a major destination for travelers 
out of Carlsbad and because San José has attractive connections to various key markets 
in the continental US and also to Hawaii. Initiation of this service, however, presents an 
interesting conundrum. If Horizon Air service is initially successful, it may grab some market 
share from SkyWest’s service to LAX. The recent cutback in capacity by SkyWest is an 
indication that the route is not very profitable, and a further drop in demand could lead to 
United withdrawing from the airport entirely. The airport may still have improved the quality 
of destinations available, but it will now be at the mercy of a startup airline whose future is 
not guaranteed.
The airport did not win the grant in the 2010 round of the SCASDP. In a review of the 
SCASDP program the GAO has noted that the criteria used by the DOT is not clear and 
needs to be improved.21 Currently, the probability of the service being initiated looks very 
slim. Small airports around the country routinely face this challenge of retaining the service 
of the incumbent airlines, usually legacy carriers when they try to bring in new airlines to 
broaden the range of destinations they serve. Even medium-hub airports have lost service 
from incumbent legacy airlines when they initiate service with low-cost airlines. McClellan-
Palomar airport is still facing challenges in attracting service after upgrading its terminal 
facilities, and the possibility of attracting commercial air service looks slim in the near and 
medium term. The experiences of McClellan-Palomar and San José both highlight the risk 
involved in upgrading terminal facilities with the hope of attracting services.
Based on the airlines currently operating out of San José, service from McClellan-Palomar 
to the San José will provide Carlsbad passengers access to Seattle but not New York. 
Even with service to San José, the airport leakage problem is likely to persist because 
travelers to destinations such as New York may prefer to drive to LAX for a direct flight 
rather than take a connecting flight from San José or the Bay Area.
This report does not cover Concord Airport in detail, but the airport has taken an innovative 
approach that’s worth mentioning: They lease out the surrounding land for various 
commercial developments. This has helped the airport to generate substantial revenue, 
which it has used to fund its operations. In this case, the airport is a general aviation airport 
in a populated city; hence it is a reasonable trade-off, as operational growth is limited by 
noise and environmental impacts on the community.
Discussion on Very Light Jets
Very Light Jets (VLJs) are a class of small aircraft created to fill a niche between first-class 
commercial aviation travel and corporate jet service. VLJs are usually defined as jets with 
a maximum takeoff weight less than 10,000 lbs. and are priced between $1 million and $5 
million. VLJs should seat six to ten people and are designed to be flown by single pilots. 
The aim was to provide a level of service comparable to business jets (on-demand service 
with closer access to traveler’s origin and destination) but at a cheaper cost than business 
jets.
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Currently, the purchase of a business jet is practical only for high-net-worth individuals 
and business clients who place a high value on time. Typical business jet acquisition costs 
start in the $2 million range, with maintenance and operating costs on top of that, placing 
them beyond the reach of everyday travelers. At a proposed cost closer to $1 million and 
with seating for six to ten passengers, VLJs would be practical for on-demand air taxi 
operations.
NASA’s and the Birth of VLJ Technology
The NASA Small Aircraft Transportation (SATS) program was instrumental in pushing the envelope on the 
technology needed to develop VLJs. Eclipse Aviation was an initial leader in development of VLJ aircraft with 
its Eclipse 500 model. It was anticipated during the (SATS) program that the Eclipse 500 would be an ideal 
aircraft that could be used to deploy a national air taxi system. Some of the features that made it attractive 
were its six-seat capacity, advertised price of less than $1 million and state-of-the-art avionics equipment that 
would allow it to be flown safely by a single pilot. 
The Eclipse Aviation company went bankrupt in 2008 after delivering about 100 aircraft and was sold to 
Eclipse Aerospace. Eclipse Aerospace announced the official launch of their Eclipse 550 twin-engine jet 
which it plans to begin delivering in 2013. The new jets will be priced at a little over $2 million.
The ability of VLJ aircraft to fly out of smaller airports means they could potentially be used 
to provide service at these smaller airports. This section looks at both the potential and 
some of the issues that could affect viable VLJ operations at smaller airports.
As noted by Kananfani and Mahmoud,22 though small communities within the shadow of large 
hubs (125 miles) struggle to retain scheduled commercial air service, they do experience 
significant growth in general aviation traffic. In their study, Kanafani and Mahmoud noted 
that most of this traffic is business related. They also note that a high percentage of those 
who drive long distances to the hub airports in these small communities are business 
travelers. Studies show business travelers place a premium on time, and hence value 
airports with a high frequency of departures, as this reduces the amount of schedule delay 
they experience when they plan trips.
UTILIZATION OF GENERAL AVIATION SERVICE AT SMALLER AIRPORTS
The VLJ aircraft will present a possible opportunity for small airports (such as McClellan-
Palomar) to meet the travel needs of their business travelers using nonscheduled on-
demand air transportation. The availability of on-demand transportation significantly 
reduces the schedule delay element for business travelers. If the aircraft acquisition, 
maintenance and operating costs can be brought low enough, VLJs may revolutionize the 
traffic demand at smaller airports the same way low-cost carriers have positively impacted 
secondary airports. Cost will be a significant factor in this process.
McClellan-Palomar airport has several business jets and general aviation aircraft stationed 
and operating out of the airport. There is also a fixed-bas operator (FBO) and several 
manufacturers based on the airport property. Obviously, the businesses maintain their jets 
for travel by their employees. An interesting question is whether airports like McClellan-
Palomar could utilize VLJ-type, on-demand air taxi operations to meet demand in a cost-
effective manner.
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Figures 3 and 4 present the cost profile of a typical jet and turboprop business aircraft 
(developed by researchers at Virginia during NASA’s Small Aircraft Transportation 
Program). First, a comparison of the two figures shows that the cost per seat-mile to 
operate a business jet is significant compared to that of a turboprop aircraft. Several 
business jets were in the Virginia Tech model, but Figure 3 shows the cost range for jets 
less than 25,000 lbs. (close to weight range of a VLJ). Figure 3 shows that for any type 
of air taxi service with a jet to be feasible, both the annual hours of operation and the 
average stage length need to be very high. Even with those two factors coming together, 
the cost-per-seat-mile is still more than $1 (average annual hours of operation close 800 
and average stage length greater than 500 miles).
 
Figure 3. Cost per Mile of Business Jet Aircraft Over Stage Length and Annual 
Utilization (8 Passenger Learjet 31A and 7-9 Passenger Beechjet 400A)
 Learjet 31A 
Beechjet 400A 
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Figure 4. Cost-per-Seat-Mile of a Pilatus PC-12 Single Engine Turboprop Aircraft 
Over Stage Length and Annual Utilization
A $1 cost per seat-mile will be prohibitive to most business travelers. Travelers in small 
communities need to be extremely wealthy or have a very high-priority, critical mission 
that is time-sensitive enough to warrant the cost of the service. A pure VLJ on-demand 
air service will not be suitable for these small airports. In the same scenario the turboprop 
cost per seat-mile of 60 cents is still prohibitive but a more feasible operational price than 
that for jet service (or VLJ).
The McClellan-Palomar airport has a large number of business jet aircraft stationed at 
the general aviation portion of the airport. These aircraft belong to business and are used 
only a fraction of the time. The airport authority can explore the opportunity of having 
some of the aircraft used for on-demand air taxi service to select destinations that their 
business travelers frequent. Such a program will require some amount of planning and will 
require skilled consultants and experts to develop a feasible operating scheme. However 
it is neither infeasible nor farfetched from the fractional ownership model where several 
business team up to use/share a single aircraft. The final decision to participate in such 
a program will be made by the businesses that own the private jets, but the airport could 
fund studies to investigate the feasibility of such a program.
This could also be an opportunity a private entrepreneur could explore. The key fact is that 
increased service will lead to increased revenue for the airport. If the plan is well structured, 
the income from flights will reduce ownership costs for aircraft owners. If destinations are 
well selected (in the case of Palomar airport), such a program will meet the needs of some 
of the business travelers who are commuting up to two hours to access flights at Los 
Angeles and San Diego airports. 
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SUSTAINING AIR SERVICE THROUGH THE ESSENTIAL AIR SERVICE 
PROGRAM
The Essential Air Service program (EAS) is another alternative source to which some 
smaller airports in the state have turned in order to sustain air traffic. The program was 
included and initialized in 1978 Airline Deregulation Act23 in response to concerns that 
airlines would withdraw service from small communities once the act took effect. Under 
the EAS program, the federal government through the FAA provided subsidies to airline 
carriers to provide air services to small communities. The program was initially authorized 
for ten years but was extended for ten more years in 1987 under the Airport and Airway 
Safety and Capacity Expansion Act.24 The program was further extended under the Rural 
Air Service Act25 in 1996. The 1996 act more than doubled the program’s funding from 
$24 million to $50 million. According to the latest GAO report on the program, the funding 
level is now at $109.4 million.26 Eligibility criteria for participating in the program have been 
refined with each act, and by 1989 the key criteria were:
• The community must be more than 70 highway miles from the nearest medium or 
large hub
• The community must be 55 highway miles or more from the nearest small hub airport 
or at least 45 miles from the nearest non-hub airport which enplanes a minimum of 
100 passengers per day
• The subsidy per passenger cannot exceed $200 unless the community is more than 
210 miles from a large- or medium-hub airport
• The communities must have been receiving scheduled air service prior to October 
24, 1978 when the Deregulation Act was passed27,28
Though the EAS criteria are defined by community, and the program is aimed at providing 
air service to the community, the actual subsidy is disbursed to an airline servicing an 
airport in the community. It is also worth noting that when the program refers to “hubs” they 
are usually referring to the community.
The airline, not the community, applies for participation in the program. The DOT reimburses 
the airline the difference between revenues from fares and operation costs, with a 5 percent 
markup allowed for profits. The markup value is based on the language in the 1996 Act 
that provides for a reasonable rate of return on investment to the carrier.
There is debate about whether the EAS program has been useful. In an early review 
of the program, Williamson et al., proposed that it would be more efficient if states and 
local agencies rather that the federal government funded the program.29 In another review, 
Cunningham30 found that the program did increase service level at the communities that 
were served. He found some evidence indicating the program was effective in keeping 
fares down but concluded that program was not essential or critical, as the subsidy was 
only supporting a small section of the population (25,000) and mainly benefited the airlines 
participating in the program.
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In a review by the Government Accountability Office in 2000, it was found that the program 
had generally met its objective of ensuring that smaller communities continue to receive 
scheduled air service.31 The report noted that Congress had tightened the eligibility criteria 
used to determine which communities qualified for the EAS program. The report said that 
although funding levels had increased substantially in 1996, most of that increase had 
been absorbed by the increasing cost of providing the subsidized service.
Essential Air Service at California Airports
Currently only four communities in California receive service through the EAS program. 
Merced and Visalia are provided with twice-a-day round-trip direct flights by Great 
Lakes Airlines from Merced Regional and Visalia Municipal airports, respectively. Great 
Lakes Airlines operates out of both airports using a Beechcraft 1900D aircraft that seats 
19 passengers. According to publicly available application of the airline, the subsidy 
for the Merced-Las Vegas operation was set at $1,367 per flight. The airline estimated 
approximately 9.5 passengers per flight so this subsidy covers the 10 empty seats and 
translates to approximately $146 per seat. At that rate, the subsidy is about 56 percent 
of the total cost of the flight. For the Visalia-Los Angeles operation, the subsidy is $1,218 
per flight with an estimated 7.2 passengers per flight. The subsidy translates to 63 percent 
of the cost of operations. The airline provides service seven days a week at each of the 
airports.
Service at Crescent City and El Centro is provided by SkyWest Airlines under United 
Express, a subsidiary of United Airlines. At Crescent City, the airline’s application requested 
two round trips per day, seven days a week, in a 30-seat Embraer-Brasilia aircraft. The 
airline operates out of Crescent City/Jack McNamara airport. At El Centro, SkyWest is 
providing one round-trip per day for only six days. The airline operates out of Imperial 
Airport and had earlier requested to cease operations to the community but the request 
was declined by the DOT based on comments received from the community. According 
to the latest EAS applications of the airlines, the subsidies at Crescent City and El Centro 
operations are at 46 percent and 32 percent, respectively. It is obvious why SkyWest 
wanted to withdraw.
A summary of the cost of operation, revenue and subsidy from the EAS program at the 
four California airports is shown in Table 9. The table shows that the subsidies at the four 
air service communities in California are very high, with ticket subsidies ranging 30 percent 
to 63 percent. 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Until recently, the hub-and-spoke operating paradigm of the legacy airlines concentrated 
most of the traffic at the two major airports in California, Los Angeles International and San 
Francisco airports. Airport managers and planners had long argued for a wider distribution 
of the traffic among airports, citing congestion at the hubs and the cascading gridlock on 
the national airspace systems as these hub airports experienced a surge in demand. In 
the deregulated environment, the legacy airlines are focused on maximizing their profits; it 
is not a priority for them to ensure that available capacity in the national airport system or 
airspace is equitably utilized. 
As low-cost airlines like Southwest, JetBlue and Allegiant entered the California market 
they opted to initiate service mainly out of the secondary airports like Oakland, Bob Hope, 
Long Beach and Ontario airports, among others. Currently the low-cost airlines are the 
major carriers at seven of the top 15 airports in the state, and Southwest Airlines is the 
dominant airline by passenger enplanements. The success of these airlines and their 
growth has generated significant traffic at the secondary airports from which they operate. 
The secondary airports welcome these air carriers and have even put in incentive schemes 
in some cases to attract and retain them. Though not the intent, the low-cost carriers’ 
preference for secondary airports has thus led to a more even distribution of traffic among 
airports in the state.
The low-cost airlines tend to favor the secondary airports for a variety of reasons, including 
the opportunity to negotiate low facility usage fees, reduced congestion at these airports 
on the airside, and lack of competition from entrenched legacy airlines for facilities and 
gates, among others. Access to these underutilized airports has enabled them to operate 
efficiently and at low costs. 
Two of the most pronounced impacts of LC airlines at secondary airports in California 
have been JetBlue’s service at Long Beach Airport and Southwest’s service at Oakland 
International. Long Beach jumped from a rank of 143 in 2001 to 93 in 2002 in the FAA 
airport enplanements rankings. The airport has continued to attract passengers and is 
currently (in 2012) ranked 75 in the latest published FAA rankings. From 1990 to 1995 to 
2000, enplanements at Oakland airport went from 2.6 to 4.7 to 5.1 million as Southwest 
airlines transitioned from the second to the dominant carrier at the airport. The low-cost 
airlines are increasingly gaining market share from the legacy airlines.
The increased operations, however, have meant more noise impacts on surrounding 
communities at these airports, and, according to airport staff interviewed, engaging with the 
communities and mitigating the noise impacts have been their most prominent challenges. 
As traffic has grown, the LCCs have found the noise restrictions to be problematic. JetBlue 
began to schedule flights out of Los Angeles International as they used up their available 
slots at Long Beach airport. Southwest is running up against noise restrictions in Burbank.
Even when low-cost airlines operate out of secondary airports, they still face competitive 
pressures from carriers at the primary airport as they draw from the same market. An 
illustrative example is that when Virgin America announced plans to initiate service at 
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SFO, several of the airlines, including Southwest Airlines, increased their flights at SFO. 
Southwest Airlines transferred some of its flights from OAK to SFO. This shows that the 
low-cost carriers do not necessarily dislike primary hub airports; they will use them as and 
when they fit into their strategic plan.
The key implication for the secondary airports is that they cannot rest on their laurels and 
assume that the low-cost carriers are permanent tenants. They need to address the issues 
that are constraining the operations of the LCCs if they want to retain them as tenants.
Despite the attractive prospect they offer, low-cost airlines have brought their own risks 
to secondary airports. The most critical has been their financial stability. As mentioned 
earlier, Oakland lost 30 percent of its traffic when multiple low-cost airlines failed financially 
in 2010. This threw a big wrench into development plans and halted several terminal 
expansion plans.
For the smaller airports in the state, their biggest challenge has been “airport leakage.” 
This occurs when passengers drive past their local airports to larger airports in order to 
access cheaper fares and a wider selection of destinations. One of our case study airports, 
McClellan-Palomar, was a classic example, where residents drive almost two hours to 
fly out of Los Angeles International and an hour to fly out of San Diego airport. The key 
reason for such behavior is well documented in the literature: Travelers select departure 
airports that have lower fares and a high frequency of departing flights to their destination. 
The number of departing flights is especially critical for business travelers as it allow more 
flexibility in scheduling departure time. Non-business travelers are more sensitive to cost 
than flight frequency. Our study found that small airports (and even secondary airports, 
such as San José) face a steep challenge in dealing with airport leakage. Both McClellan-
Palomar and San José made significant upgrades to their infrastructure (terminal and 
runways) without putting the requisite upfront effort in marketing their airports. Both ended 
up with expensive facilities that they now have to spend considerable time and effort to 
market to prospective airlines. 
Given the growing dominance of the LC airlines, they stand to transform the aviation 
market space dramatically. The current secondary airports need to work hard to retain 
their services. The LCCs also have a very different approach to airport investment, to 
which airports must adjust. The key differences are a focus on cost minimization and an 
emphasis on utility vs. grand architecture in terminal design.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECONDARY AIRPORTS
Secondary airports need to address the following issues:
Realize the emerging role of LCCs: LCCs are currently the key drivers of growth at 
secondary airports, and if the current trend continues there is the possibility they will 
become the dominant domestic carriers in the US. Appropriate planning for secondary 
airports will require understanding the needs and behaviors of this group.
Also, based on the experience of JetBlue building up flights at Los Angeles International, 
and Southwest shifting flights from Oakland to San Francisco, secondary airports need 
to realize that they do not have a monopoly on the LCCs. In fact, the current advantage 
they enjoy may be in jeopardy as the LCCs become larger and gain enough clout to 
negotiate attractive agreements with primary airports. 
Use discernment when selecting LCCs: When working to attract LCCs, airports 
need to carefully consider the needs of their core communities. San José has decided 
that an LCC that provides cheap flights to tourist destinations will not serve the 
needs of their core business market, information technology industries. In addition, 
the bankruptcies of several LCCs should serve as a reminder that substantial due 
diligence is needed when choosing an LCC to partner with, since the presence of the 
LCC has long-term implications for the airport.
Understand the LCC approach to airport development: LCCs initially partner with 
secondary airports through negotiated terms of agreements for use of their facilities. In 
the past, these agreements have usually included some form of reduced landing fees 
and passenger guarantees as an incentive for the airline to initiate operations from the 
airport. At this stage, most LCCs do not make any substantial investment in the airport.
Once the initial phase of the incentive program expires and the projected passenger 
traffic materializes, both parties begin to transition in and negotiate more permanent 
terms. It is usually at this stage that the LCC will begin to consider substantial 
investment in airport infrastructure. At Oakland Airport, Southwest Airlines invested 
in the development of Terminal B, and JetBlue recently completed Terminal 5 at JFK 
airport in New York.
As mentioned earlier, LCCs take a very utilitarian and cost-sensitive approach to 
development of terminal buildings. Airport authorities need to familiarize themselves 
with the priorities of this new type of client if they want to retain them. Insights like this 
on the type of infrastructure investments LCCs are willing to make during their tenure 
should be proactively used by planners as they decide which facilities to upgrade, and 
what types of upgrades to make.
Educate LCCs on their airport needs: LLCs are cost sensitive and focus on ticketed 
air travelers, and this may not always align with the interests of airport owners. The 
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LCCs prefer to set up concessions post-security, but this this may deprive airport 
users who do not pass through security, such as those picking up and dropping off 
passenger. At airports where there is substantial pick-up and drop-off, this group 
of non-passenger airport users might represent a missed-income opportunity. It is 
up to airport managers to negotiate with and educate the LCC to adopt a broader 
perspective.
Adopt a more strategic airport infrastructure investment approach: Much has been 
written on the need to transition away from making massive one-time investments in 
airport infrastructure; however it appears this is practice is still occurring, as illustrated 
by San José airport. It is not clear whether the size of the newly remodeled San José 
terminal was based on a single forecast, but the fact that the airport is now actively 
trying to engage prospective tenants makes it appear to be a case of putting the cart 
before the horse.
Partner with the community: This is an area where secondary airports are beginning 
to get it right. Burbank airport’s example of proactively engaging with the community 
on noise compliance, and San José’s example of teaming with the local business 
community to develop and identify prospective air service destinations are, excellent 
examples of the benefits of such an approach. The core issue is that airports must 
realize their immediate neighbors are the ones most impacted by their operations, and 
they should be treated as key stakeholders in developing and operating the airport.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SMALL AIRPORTS
The smaller airports in the state are the most challenged in terms of attracting passengers 
and generating revenue to sustain their operations. They have very limited options, as 
several of them, such as McClellan-Palomar, are within driving distance of either primary or 
secondary airports. In such cases, it is inefficient even for LCCs to initiate service to these 
airports, as this would spread their limited resources too thin and increase their operating 
costs. With increasing competition from the LCCs, legacy airlines are consolidating 
their operations and actually cutting service to these smaller airports. Yet, despite these 
obstacles, there are still a few options these airports can explore:
Proactively create an air service development plan: Given their size and the 
level of airport leakage they experience, smaller airports that want to attract traffic 
need to invest in an air service development study. The study should identify the 
key destinations the community needs to reach (usually through a survey) and 
quantitatively estimate the demand to see if it is high enough to warrant commercial air 
service. Most communities will need to hire a consultant to conduct the study, as these 
smaller airports usually have limited staff whose expertise rarely includes research. 
However, airport staff need to be involved as well. The most critical part of the process 
is engaging with the community to learn their needs, and airport staff are typically the 
most knowledgeable in this area.
Realistically size airport development to passenger demand: In the case of 
McClellan-Palomar the level of investment seems high considering the level of 
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passenger demand. In discussions, the airport staff said that traffic had been growing 
steadily when the terminal construction was planned. However, as mentioned earlier, 
traffic trends in the aviation world change very quickly due to the wide range of factors 
that impact airline costs and, hence, would-be passenger decisions. It would have 
been more effective if, prior to terminal development, funds had been dedicated to 
building traffic to absorb some of the additional capacity that was going to come online 
from the project. Airports need to move toward a policy of adding capacity only when 
they are close to reaching capacity, and, even then, in a staggered manner. This is 
especially crucial for smaller airports that exist in the shadow of bigger ones.
Compete for available funds: Most airports in California do not qualify for EAS, 
however, there are federal funding sources, such as the SCASDP grant McClellan-
Palomar applied for, that airports are allowed to use toward air service developments. 
The amount of money in the SCASDP is limited, but for those airports that find enough 
demand to justify bringing commercial air service to their community, it is an option 
they should compete for. 
Consider innovative approaches: As mentioned earlier, a pure on-demand VLJ 
service is probably too expensive for business travelers in most small communities. 
Though the air taxi system envisaged by NASA and the developers of the Eclipse 
500 aircraft has not yet materialized (due to bankruptcy of the manufacturer and the 
inability of the leading purchaser of the Eclipse, DayJet, headquartered in Florida, to 
maintain operations, leading to DayJet’s bankruptcy in 2008), there is still potential to 
use the concept to serve some constrained communities.
Some small communities have underutilized corporate aircraft that are parked at the 
airport. If creatively scheduled, these could be used to serve business travelers in the 
community willing to pay a premium for the reduced travel time and shorter schedule 
delay offered by such a system. The scheduling, pricing, insurance and legal hurdles 
required to set up such a system are not trivial but also not insurmountable. Much 
of the fundamental research needed for the operations side of such a system has 
been developed under the FAA- and NASA-sponsored Small Aircraft Transportation 
System program.33,34,35,36,37 Implementing such a program, however, would involve 
some complexity (as noted in a National Research Council Report38). A pilot program 
may be the most cost-effective approach to test if such a service will work.
MANAGING THE AIRPORTS AS A SYSTEM
Though this study focuses on the secondary airports, one major recommendation is that 
the state get engaged in the development of airports in the long term. Existing legislative 
framework limits the states’ ability to do that – the mandate to operate and manage public 
use airports currently belongs to local authorities, such as cities and counties in whose 
jurisdiction the airport resides. The state as an entity does not need to manage the airports, 
but it could modify the legislation to give the metropolitan planning agencies, such as 
MTC and SCAG, more jurisdiction and control. It would be more efficient for the three 
major airports in the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, to be operated under a single 
authority, similar to the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority that manages Baltimore, 
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Washington Dulles and Regan National airports. The airports in Northern California have 
some level of collaboration, but it is related only to traffic management.
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APPENDIX A: VERY LIGHT JET COST MODEL 
While working at Virginia Tech, Dr. Ashiabor developed an aircraft cost model that can 
be used to estimate the operating cost for using Very Light Jet aircraft.39 The model was 
developed while conducting research to assist NASA in estimating the systems deployment 
cost of a conceptual small aircraft transportation system that was meant to operate as a 
national air taxi service over the continental US. The cost model is predicated on the 
assumption that aircraft in such a system will have costs between those of current general 
aviation and commercial airlines. A section of the cost model from the thesis is reproduced 
here.
Linear regression models were developed to predict the acquisition cost and various 
components of the fixed and variable costs. The aim of the regression analysis was to select 
as input independent variables that were easily obtainable from aircraft manufacturers and 
operators for both aircraft that are in production and those in the design stage. This would 
then make it easy to model the cost of VLJ vehicles in the future once these variables are 
estimated.
The regression models were developed using multivariate analysis and correlation analysis 
techniques to select the most appropriate variables. The data used to develop the model 
was from the Business & Commercial Aviation Purchasing and Planning Handbook and 
Operations and Planning Guide.
Twenty-five aircraft were used to derive realistic values in the jet model and eleven in the 
turboprop model.
Model Structure
Typically, airline accounts are classified into operating (items directly related to airlines 
services) and non-operating (items not directly related to the airlines services, such as gains 
or losses from retirement of property, interest on loans, foreign exchange transactions, 
etc.). The operating items may be costs or revenues. The costs are further classified into 
direct and indirect operating cost. Under ICAO’s classification, direct costs include:
• Flight operations
• Maintenance and overhaul
• Depreciation and amortization
Indirect costs include:
• Station and ground expenses
• Passenger services
• Ticketing, sales and promotion
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• General administrative
• Other operating costs
The model uses a similar structure but omits some of the costs, such as ticketing and sales 
that are not a significant part of current general aviation operating costs.
Model Input Variables
Input variables to the models can be grouped into two categories: those used to derive 
regression expressions and those used directly as input to the model. All data for these 
two models was derived from the 2001 Business and Commercial Aviation annual FBO 
and aircraft manufacturer surveys.
Variables used to derive regression equations are operating empty weight (lb.), fuel flow 
rate (lb./hour), engine power (horsepower), interior area/seat (sq. ft.), and purchase price 
of aircraft ($). Other variables used directly as input to the model include liability insurance 
($), software maintenance costs ($), hangar costs ($), miscellaneous costs ($) and salaries. 
Where it was not possible to obtain good fit or reasonable regression expressions for 
variables, the average or actual costs in the Business and Commercial Aviation publication 
was used.
Acquisition Costs
The aircraft is assumed to be operated over a lifecycle of ten years. The independent 
variable used to estimate the acquisition cost was the “operating empty weight” and “area 
per seat” for the jets and “operating empty weight” for turboprop aircraft. The estimated 
costs are in dollars and represent the market value of the aircraft in 2001. The value used 
in computations is the depreciated value over ten years.
In order to depreciate the aircraft acquisition cost, salvage values had to be estimated. 
Business and Commercial Aviation contains data acquisition costs of aircraft when they 
were manufactured and their used prices in 2001. An analysis of the data shows that 
single-engine aircraft are losing only 10 percent of their value over a 10 year period with 
turboprops losing 50 percent and jets 15 percent. The salvage values used were 90 
percent, 50 percent and 85 percent for single-engines multi-engines and jets, respectively.
The rapid drop in value of the multi-engine turboprops may be due to the steady drop in jet 
aircraft prices. Though single-engine aircraft prices seem to retain their value, it should be 
noted that they are relatively inexpensive relative to other aircraft types, with acquisition 
costs well below $1 million.
Turboprops range from $1 million to $4 million, while general aviation jets range from $2 
million to $20 million, and above.
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Variable Operating Costs
For the variable costs, the direct operating cost in seat-per-mile was estimated using 
“operating empty weight,” “area per seat,” and “power of the engine” as independent 
variables.
The direct operating cost in dollars per mile (dependent variable) obtained from the 
regression expression is then multiplied by the speed and hours flown per year to obtain 
the annual cost in dollars. The variable operation costs are those related to operating the 
aircraft and include maintenance, fuel, parts and trip-related expenses.
Fixed Operating Costs
The indirect operating cost is categorized as fixed costs, periodic maintenance costs, 
flight and crew costs, and facilities costs. The fixed costs were comprised of hull and 
liability insurance, maintenance and software costs, and miscellaneous service costs. The 
periodic costs included engine overhaul, midlife hot-section inspection, painting, interior 
refurbishment and modernization and upgrade costs.
The “Other Costs” categories include pilot and crew salaries, training, and salary costs, 
and the facilities cost (included hanger costs and other miscellaneous expenditure). 
Regression fits were derived for some of the dependent variables, but in most cases it 
was difficult to obtain a good fit and the values provided in the Business and Commercial 
Aviation database was used directly in the model.
Very Light Jet Cost Structure
The operation costs of aircraft are influenced by the number of hours the aircraft is operated 
and the stage length of the trips. The model developed is able to predict the total operating 
cost in dollars per seat-mile, given the annual number of hours the aircraft is operated and 
an average stage length.
The model estimates the annual acquisition cost, annual fixed operating costs and annual 
variable operating costs. The sum of these are then divided by the total number of miles 
the aircraft is flown per year to obtain the total operating cost per mile (number of miles 
flown per year is obtained by multiplying the average speed of the aircraft by the annual 
hours of operation). The current model output is for 400, 600 and 800 hours of operations 
per year, with average stage lengths of 300, 600 and 1,000 nautical miles for all aircraft 
except the ultra-long-range jets which have output for 1,000, 3,000 and 6,000 nautical 
miles.
The mode of operation of VLJs will greatly influence the number of hours flown annually 
and the aim of determining the operating cost for different annual hours of operation is 
to capture this variation in cost. The number of seats on the aircraft is multiplied by a 
load factor (currently this is input is set at 70 percent but can be easily changed to reflect 
different operating policies) and this is used to derive the cost per seat-mile of the class of 
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aircraft. The load factor adjusts for the fact that most of these aircraft are not operated at 
full capacity most of the time.
The cost per seat-mile for a single engine Pilatus PC-12 and a typical ultra-long-range 
business jet aircraft are shown for comparison. In addition to acquisition cost, the key 
to keeping costs low is being able to generate enough demand so the aircraft can be 
operated for longer hours.
As the VLJ aircraft transportation technology is deployed, it is likely that the initial travelers 
to switch to this mode would be full-fare-paying coach and first-class airline travelers. The 
attractiveness of the mode to travelers will be determined, to a large extent, by the cost of 
travel.
 
Figure 3 (repeated for reference): Cost per Mile of Business Jet Aircraft Over Stage 
Length and Annual Utilization (8 Passenger Learjet 31A and 7-9 Passenger 
Beechjet 400A)
 Learjet 31A 
Beechjet 400A 
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Figure 4 (repeated for reference): Cost-per-Seat-Mile of a Pilatus PC-12 Single 
Engine Turboprop Aircraft Over Stage Length and Annual Utilization
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